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Book Review 
Justifying Racial Reform 
CONTEMPT AND PITY: SOCIAL POLICY AND THE IMAGE OF THE DAMAGED 
BLACK PSYCHE, 1880-1996. By Daryl Michael Scott.t Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1997. Pp. xix, 269. $39.95.* 
Davison M. Douglas* 
[African Americans] want what is due them, rather than pity and 
sympathy. They think that if you have to make people look bad 
or broken up before you can get the country to give them what 
they should have by right, then that's the same old racism and 
segregation at work.-African-American minister, 19651 
African Americans have had an undeniably unique experience in this 
country, surviving three centuries of the ravages of slavery and 
postemancipation oppression. How has this history affected subsequent 
generations of African Americans? And in what ways should contempo-
rary public policy be reshaped to account for this legacy? 
Social scientists and policymakers have wrestled with these questions 
for more than a century. Their conclusions, not surprisingly, have varied 
drama~ically over time. Daryl Michael Scott, in his fascinating new book, 
Contempt and Pity: Social Policy and the Image of the Damaged Black 
Psyche, 1880-1996, has written a history of the ways in which intellectuals 
and policymakers have both characterized the personality of African 
Americans and used those characterizations to influence this country's 
racial policies. Although these characterizations, or "images," have 
• Assistant Professor of Histocy, Columbi.a University. B.A. 1984, Marquette University; Ph.D. 
1993, Stanford University. 
t Hereinafter cited by page number only. 
* Professor of Law and Director of Institute of Bill of Rights Law, William and Mazy School of 
Law. I would like to thank David Hitchens for his research assistance. 
1. P. 185 (quoting ROBERT COLES, CHILDREN OF CRISIS 143 (1967) (emphasis in original)). 
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varied, a common theme of the last fifty years (but with roots in the 
writings of W.E.B. Du Bois at the tum of the century2) has been the effort 
by racial liberals to construct African Americans as damaged and to use 
that "damage imagery" to build support for progressive racial policies. 
The arguments in favor of school desegregation in Brown v. Board of 
Education3 and affirmative action in the mid-1960s, for example, were 
premised in part on the notion that African Americans had been damaged 
by racial discrimination and segregation. 
Scott argues that although damage imagery may have played an impor-
tant role in efforts to attack segregation and racial discrimination, the use 
of this imagery has had profound negative consequences for African 
Americans and should be eschewed. According to Scott, liberal use of 
damage imagery has "made black rights contingent upon white sympathy 
and superiority rather than black equality and citizenship. "4 Moreover, 
the use of such imagery, designed to evoke sympathy, too often evokes 
contempt and is easily co-opted to justify anti-black attitudes and policies. 
As long as African Americans are conceived of as "damaged," or a 
"problem people, "5 they will inevitably remain mired in negative stereo-
types and will seek to define themselves against a white norm. 
Scott's intellectual history is not chiefly concerned with legal doctrine, 
but his analysis has significant implications for the contemporary legal and 
political debate over race-conscious social policies. The central issue in 
this country's racial policy during the last thirty years has been whether the 
race of individuals should matter in an array of public and private 
decisions: who is admitted to a university, 6 who is employed/ how voting 
2. Pp. 5-6. See, e.g., W .E.B. DUBOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK (1903), reprinted in W .E.B. 
DU BOIS: WRITINGS 357 (1986). 
3. 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
4. P. 184. 
5. CORNEL WESf, RACE MATIERS 2 (1993) (quoting Dorothy I. Height). 
6. Challenges to affirmative action in university admissions have escalated within the past few 
years. In 1996, the United States Coun of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found the University of Texas 
School of Law's consideration of rare in its admission policy to violate the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996). Affirmative action 
policies at other universities, such as the University of Michigan and the University of Washington, 
have also recently heen challenged in litigation. See Gratz v. Bollinger, No. 97-75231 (E.D. Mich. 
filed Oct. 14, 1997); Smith v. University of Wash. Law Sch., No. 97-335 (W.D. Wash. filed Mar. 
15, 1997); Harvey Berkman, Supremes May Get Other Affirmative Action Cases, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 
8, 1997, at A10. California Proposition 209, approved by the voters, bars the use of race in the 
admission practice at schools in the California university system. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31. 
7. Both governmental entities and private businesses have used affirmative action policies in their 
hiring practices for the past quarter century. Increasingly, the use of affirmative action among 
governmental employers is under challenge. Affirmative action promotion policies for police officers 
have been held unconstitutional. See Middleton v. City of Flint, 92 F.3d 396 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. 
denied, 117 S. Ct. 1552 (1997); Police Ass'n v. City of New Orleans, 100 F.3d 1159 (5th Cir. 1996). 
An affirmative action hiring program for a fire department was held unconstitutional in Alexander v. 
1998] Justifying Racial Reform 1165 
districts are constructed, 8 how government contracts are distributed,9 and 
how children are assigned to school. 10 Proponents of color blindness 
argue that consideration of race in these decisions, even if done for benign 
reasons, is both unconstitutional and immoral. 11 Critics of color blindness 
argue that attention to race is justified given this country's past treatment 
of racial minorities. 12 Reasons proffered in support of race-conscious 
programs such as affirmative action vary, but one important rationale has 
been that such programs are necessary to mitigate the harmful effects of 
years of racial discrimination in this country. 
Should this nation continue to follow remedial policies that involve 
race consciousness, such as affirmative action and school desegregation? 
If so, in justifying such policies, should policymakers reject considerations 
that African Americans have been harmed or "damaged" by our history of 
Estepp, 95 F.3d 312 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied sub nom. Prince George's County v. Alexander, 117 
S. Ct. 1425 (1997). In Taxman v. Board of Education, 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 
ll7 S. Ct. 2506, and cert. dismissed, ll8 S. Ct. 595 (1997), a school board was not permitted to 
advance the goal of racial diversity through nonremedial discriminatory layoffs. See id. at 1567; see 
also Messer v. Meno, 130 F.3d 130 (5th Cir. 1997) (reversing the trial court's dismissal of a 
discrimination claim against the Texas Education Agency for implementing a gender and racial work 
force balance program). 
8. Although the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, permits the use of race in the 
construction of voting districts as a remedy to overcome violations of the Act, in recent years the 
Supreme Court has called into question the legitimacy of such remedies. See Abrams v. Johnson, 117 
S. Ct. 1925 (1997); Bush v. Vera, II6 S. Ct. 1941 (1996); Shaw v. Hunt, II6 S. Ct. 1894 (1996); 
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). See generally Richard 
H. Pildes, Principled Limitations on Racial and Partisan Redistricting, 106 YALE L.J. 2505 (1997). 
9. In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), the Supreme Court struck down 
the federal government's practice of giving general contractors on government construction projects a 
financial incentive to hire subcontractors controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged groups 
defined by race and ethnicity. See id. at 205-06; see also Contractor's Ass'n v. City of Philadelphia, 
91 F.3d 586 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, II7 S. Ct. 953 (1997) (finding that the city's set-aside 
program for black construction contractors was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state 
interest). 
10. During the past ten years, dozens of school districts have persuaded federal courts to allow 
them to abandon busing plans in favor of neighborhood schools or magnet schools, notwithstanding the 
resegregative effect of those decisions. See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992) (DeKalb 
County, Georgia); United States v. Overton, 834 F.2d ll71 (5th Cir. 1987) (Austin, Texas); Arthur 
v. Nyquist, 904 F. Supp. ll2 (W.D.N.Y. 1995)( Buffalo, New York); Keyes v. Congress of Hispanic 
Educators, 902 F. Supp. 1274 (D. Colo. 1995) (Denver, Colorado); Coalition to Save Our Children 
v. State Bd. of Educ., 901 F. Supp. 784 (D. Del. 1995) (Northern New Castle County, Delaware), 
aff'd, 90 F.3d 752 (3d Cir. 1996); Dowell v. Board of Educ., 606 F. Supp. 1548 (W.D. Okla. 1985) 
(Oklahoma City, Oklahoma), rev'd, 195 F.2d 1516 (lOth Cir. 1986); Riddick v. School Bd., 627 F. 
Supp. 814 (E.D. Va. 1984)(Norfolk, Virginia), aff'd, 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1986). This trend shows 
no signs of abating. 
11. See, e.g., JOHN DAVID SKRENTNY, THE IRONIES OF AFARMATIVE ACI10N: POLmCS, 
CULTURE, AND JUSTICE IN AMERICA 19-35 (1996). 
12. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Equality and Impasse: Mobilizing Group-Based Perspectives in 
an Era of Group-Blindness, in REDEFINING EQUALITY 13 (Neal Devins & Davison M. Douglas eds., 
1998); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution Is Color-Blind", 44 STAN. L. REV. I (1991); 
David A. Strauss, The Myth ofColr•",;""'"~'" 1ao,;: c;,"n ,...,. t><=" aa 
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racial discrimination and segregation? Scott is wary of reliance on damage 
imagery, but he leaves open the question of how to justify remedial racial 
policies without resorting to notions of harm. 13 
I. History of the Use of Damage Imagery 
The bulk of Scott's book is a consideration of the ways in which social 
scientists have depicted African Americans over the course of the last 
century. Although racial conservatives dominated this depiction during the 
pre-World War I period, after the war, the construction of the image of the 
black psyche was controlled by racial liberals. During the post-World War 
II era, racial liberals depicted African Americans as damaged by racial dis-
crimination and segregation and used this damage imagery to urge an end 
to such practices. Since the mid-1960s, the image of African Americans 
as damaged has been hotly contested, but the use of damage imagery to 
justify various social policies has continued. 
Scott's intellectual history begins with the assumption that "social 
scientists are unable to overcome bias or the social and intellectual context 
in which they labor. "14 Accordingly, the construction of the black per-
sonality by social scientists has ebbed and flowed, shaped in part by the 
ideologies of those constructing the image. By tracing the development of 
social scientific perspectives on African Americans, and their resulting 
influence on policymakers, Scott offers a fascinating perspective on the 
development of racial policy in the twentieth century. 
A. The Age of Jim Crow, 1880-1920 
During the last decade of the nineteenth century and the first decade 
of the twentieth century, the South embraced an expansive policy of racial 
degradation, characterized by rigid ~egregation, disfranchisement, and fre-
quent lynchings. 15 During this period, racially conservative social sci-
entists dominated the depiction of black personality. Most of these social 
scientists justified oppressive social policies and practices such as seg-
regation and disfranchisement by arguing that African Americans suffered 
an innate inability to compete with whites that prevented them from 
13. Although Scott does not explicitly address the issue of what racial policies are appropriate at 
the end of the twentieth century, he does make clear that "my disagreement with certain integrationist 
assumptions looms large in my analysis," P. xviii, and that the embrace of certain race-conscious 
policies in the 1960s such as affirmative action "exceeded anything envisioned in the American creed." 
~~ . 
14. P. xvii. 
15. See generally J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLmcs: SUFFRAGE 
REsrR!CfiON AND THE EsrABUSHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH, 1880-1910 (1974); C. VANN 
WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (1955); ROBERT L. ZANGRANDO, THE NAACP 
CRUSADE AGAINST LYNCHING, 1909-1950 (1980). 
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assimilating into an advanced civilization. These experts did not associate 
the social and psychological problems of blacks with the oppression 
suffered under slavery and segregation. Rather, they argued that it was 
freedom from slavery that was the cause of black distress: 
Ever since the antebellum period, conservative whites, believing that 
slavery was a boon to the African, argued that African Americans 
could not survive as free people. A corollary to this view was that 
black mental health suffered in the state of freedom. The alleged 
higher rates of insanity among free blacks in northern cities was 
proffered as evidence. 16 
Conservatives used theories of black damage to justify policies of seg-
regation and disfranchisement, believing "that segregation was a humane 
form of social control because it provided the 'child race' the space to 
develop. " 17 As to the adverse effects of segregation, most social scientists 
believed that blacks were generally satisfied with their state; only the 
mulatto was unhappy with segregation. 18 
Some social scientists of this time period offered a different 
perspective, accepting the notion of black inferiority, but rejecting the 
notion that biological background necessarily determined one's status in the 
world. These social scientists supported segregation, but posited that in 
time African Americans might sufficiently develop to warrant entry into the 
mainstream of American civilization. 19 
One black scholar, W.E.B. Du Bois, explored the social and psycho-
logical impact of the adverse environment in which blacks lived. At the 
end of the nineteenth century, Du Bois called for examination of "the 
tangible phenomena of Negro prejudices in all possible cases; its effect on 
the Negro's physical development, on his mental acquisitiveness, on his 
moral and social condition. "20 Du Bois described the psychological strife 
that African Americans experienced as a result of oppression, with the 
purpose of eliciting further study of the effects of racial discrimination and 
16. P. 12. For example, Arrah B. Evarts, a government physician, commented in 1914: "It has 
been said by many observers whose word can scarce be doubted, that a crazy negro was a rare sight 
before emancipation. However that may be, we know he is by no means rare today." P. 13 (quoting 
Arrah B. Evarts, Dementia Precox in the Colored Race, 1 PSYCHOANALYTIC REV. 394 (1914)). 
17. P. 13. 
18. As Alfred Stone, a "planter-turned-social-psychologist," suggested: "The varied tragedy of 
human life furnishes few more pathetic spectacles than that of the educated mulatto. . . . Frequently 
inheriting from the superior race talents and aspirations the full play of which is denied him by his 
kinship with the inferior-through no fault of his own he is doomed to be an anachronism in American 
political and social life." P. 15 {quoting ALFRED HOLT STONE, STuDIES IN THE AMERICAN RACE 
PROBLEM 436 {n.d.)). 
19. Seep. 12 (outlining the distinction between accommodationists and competitive racists). 
20. P. 5 (quoting W.E.B. DuBois, The Study of the Negro Problem, 11 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. 
& Soc. SCI. 10 (1898)). 
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support from middle class whites for the plight of African Americans.21 
Du Bois's work, however, failed to have its desired effect. It would be 
another fifty years before social scientists would embrace the use of 
damage to shape social policy. 
B. The Interwar Years, 1920-1945 
During the years between World War I and World War II, racially lib-
eral social scientists replaced racial conservatives as the dominant group of 
experts studying African-American personality. These experts downplayed 
the view that blacks were biologically inferior to whites. For experts 
during these years, 
culture and the social environment replaced biology as the means of 
explaining black behavior. . . . This shift was the product of a 
social science community in which the leading experts who 
specialized in fields that dealt with race and African Americans 
believed that blacks could be assimilated into the mainstream of 
American life. 22 
At the same time, some interwar social scientists concluded that racial 
discrimination had damaged black psyches, particularly self esteem, but 
that this "personality damage was an outgrowth of being the subordinate 
group, not of the inability of blacks to compete with whites. "23 For those 
social scientists who did find damage, it was most acute for those African 
Americans who lived in close proximity with whites: "[T]he assumption 
that underpinned the leading theories of the interwar years was the same 
as the prevailing one of the Progressive Era: social and cultural proximity, 
not distance, caused damage to the psyches of members of subordinated 
groups. "24 
Interwar social scientists were divided on the issue of whether African 
Americans suffered self hate as a result of their predicament. Some social 
21. W.E.B. DuBois took this posture in his books, THE PHILADELPHIA NEGRO 394-97 (Schocken 
Books 1967) (1899) (suggesting that discrimination hinders blacks and that whites have a duty to stop 
discrimination primarily for their own sakes), and DU BOIS, supra note 2, at 475-92 (presenting the 
status of race relations and suggesting that both races should work together for mutual benefit). 
22. P. 19. 
23. P. xii. 
24. P. 21. Many of these theorists focused particularly on the position of the black elite: "In the 
two classic field studies that employed caste-and-class theory, the personalities of the black elite were 
depicted as relatively more damaged than those of the masses. The greater damage among the middle 
class resulted from their greater social and cultural proximity to the dominant class of the white caste." 
P. 27. 
But many "interwar social scientists did not believe that the black psyche was in a state of crisis 
as a result of racial prejudice and discrimination. In the two major research projects on African 
Americans in the interwar years, this view was reinforced. Personality damage was either ignored as 
a major issue or presented as a minor problem." Pp. 32-33. 
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scientists, such as Kenneth Clark, who would embrace self-hate theory 
during the post-World War II period when damage imagery was used for 
instrumental purposes, rejected self-hate theories during the interwar 
years.25 
One of the most significant and ambitious studies of race during the 
pre-1945 period was a fifteen-hundred page report produced under the dir-
ection of a Swedish economist, Gunnar Myrdal, entitled An American 
Dilemma.26 Myrdal's critique of American race relations largely ignored 
the issue of psychological damage among African Americans. Rather, 
Myrdal emphasized the fact that patterns of racial segregation and racial 
discrimination were inconsistent with the nation's political ideals.27 
Yet for the most part, social scientists during the interwar years did 
not attempt to shape social policies affecting African Americans.28 
During the early twentieth century, crusading experts, believing that social 
engineering was possible, had aggressively used their theories of black 
inferiority to justify segregation and disfranchisement. Social scientists of 
the interwar period abandoned this activism, and "pressed for the social 
sciences to become even more like the natural sciences. "29 As a result of 
this reluctance to mix scientific inquiry with social activism, few interwar 
social scientists pressed for social change or made appeals to white 
sympathy. This reluctance to influence political attitudes would abruptly 
change during the post-World War II era. 
C. The Civil Rights Era, 1945-1965 
During the post-World War II era social scientists studying race recast 
both their conclusions as to the effects of racial discrimination on the black 
psyche and their willingness to use damage imagery to influence social 
policy. The most interesting chapters of Scott's book delineate the ways 
in which racially liberal social scientists argued that blacks had been 
25. See p. 32; Kenneth B. Clark & Mamie K. Clark, Skin Color as a Factor in Racial 
Identification of Negro Preschool Children, 11 J. Soc. PSYCH. 159, 168 (1940). 
26. GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN 
DEMOCRACY (1944). 
27. According to Scott, 
Rather than manipulating the therapeutic as a means of dramatizing the evil of 
segregation, rather than presenting blacks as objects worthy of pity, Myrdal built his 
critique of American race relations around the nation's political ideals and appealed to the 
country's sense of justice. To the expen from abroad, the striking aspect of American 
race relations was that they contradicted the American political ideals of equality and 
opponunity. 
Pp. 34-35. 
28. For example, the studies produced for the American Youth Commission (AYC}, which Scott 
describes as the era's "most important effon to comprehend the psychological effects of segregation 
on the black psyche," downplayed damage imagery and made no appeal for white sympathy. P. 66. 
29. P. 58. 
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harmed by segregation to support desegregation and antidiscrimination pol-
icies during the twenty years following the end of World War II. 
During this time period, racial liberals continued to dominate the con-
struction of the image of African Americans, but they stressed the damag-
ing effects of racial discrimination and segregation on the black personality 
to a far greater degree than had their interwar predecessors. Part of this 
emphasis on the black psyche reflected a burgeoning interest in psychology 
during the postwar era. This interest in psychology influenced the various 
social sciences, as historians, sociologists, political scientists, and anthro-
pologists increasingly incorporated psychological theories into their 
work.30 
Moreover, social scientists embraced the notion that they should use 
their research to influence social policy. For example, in 1951, sociol-
ogists organized the Society to Study Social Problems for the purpose of 
fostering "co-operative relations among persons and organizations engaged 
in the application of scientific sociological findings to the formation of 
social policies. "31 The most dramatic example of this use of social sci-
ence to influence policy was the use of damage imagery to appeal to white 
middle-class sensibilities about the harms of segregation and discrimination. 
As Scott notes: 
Oppression was wrong, liberals suggested, because it damaged 
personalities, and changes had to be made to protect and promote the 
well-being of African Americans. Rather than standing on the ideals 
of the American creed . . . liberals capitulated to the historic 
tendency of posing blacks as objects of pity. Liberals proceeded as 
if most white Americans would have been willing to grant black 
people equal rights and services only if they were made to appear 
psychologically damaged and granted a special status as victims. 32 
This use of damage imagery played a particularly prominent role in 
the challenge to segregated schools that culminated in Brown v. Board of 
Education. In seeking to overturn the separate but equal doctrine of Plessy 
v. Ferguson,33 NAACP strategists understood that attacking school segre-
gation simply on the grounds that racial classifications violated the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was insufficient given 
prior Supreme Court decisions that accepted the legitimacy of racial class-
ifications in public education. 34 In addition, they needed to establish that 
30. See pp. 72-73. 
31. P. 73. 
32. P. xiii. 
33. 163 u.s. 537 (1896). 
34. For example, the Supreme Court implicitly endorsed the legitimacy of school segregation in 
Gong Lum v. Rice, 215 U.S. 78, 85-87 (1927) (holding that a Chinese citizen was not denied equal 
protection of the laws when she was required to attend a public school for "colored" students); Berea 
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segregation in fact caused harm to black children and hence these children 
could not receive an equal education in a segregated school. The Court in 
Plessy had held that segregation did not "stampO the colored race with a 
badge of inferiority. "35 The burden of the NAACP strategists in Brown 
was to establish that school segregation did in fact cause harm to black 
children. 
The Supreme Court had opened the door to such a strategy in Sweatt 
v. Paintei36 by holding that segregated black students could not receive 
an equal legal education because of the intangible factors that accompanied 
the training of lawyers.37 To extend this notion of educational disadvan-
tage created by segregation to the elementary and secondary level, the 
NAACP set out to demonstrate that segregation caused psychological harm 
to black children. Yet by the early 1950s, no published study had conclu-
sively found that separate but equal schools caused psychological harm to 
black children and that that harm inhibited the ability of black children to 
learn.38 As Scott notes, 
Without such studies, of course, the question of whether children 
damaged by segregated schools had learning disabilities resulting 
from segregation rather than other factors could not be answered, 
leaving those who proffered an opinion to engage in pure 
speculation. To be sure, there were damage findings among black 
children of school age, but the methodologies applied in these studies 
could not implicate segregated schools as the culprit. 39 
Although Kenneth Clark, when approached by the NAACP, initially 
indicated that he could not establish that school segregation caused 
College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 58 (1908) (holding that it is not unconstitutional for states to 
prohibit incorporated schools from educating white and minority students together); and Cumming v. 
Board of Education, 175 U.S. 528, 544-45 (1899) (refusing to compel a school board to close a high 
school for whites after the school board closed the local black high school). 
35. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551. 
36. 339 u.s. 629 (1950). 
37. See id. at 634 (stating that a "law school, the proving ground for legal learning and practice, 
cannot be effective in isolation from the individuals and institutions with which the law interacts"). 
38. See pp. 122-23. Indeed, some studies from the interwar period had suggested that black 
children benefited from school segregation. See Agnes Roberts Crowley, A Comparison of the 
Academic Achievement of Cincinnati Negroes in Segregated and Mixed Schools (1931) (unpublished 
Ed.D. dissertation, University of Cincinnati); Jennie D. Porter, The Problem of Negro Education in 
Northern and Border Cities (1928) (unpublished Ed.D. dissertation, University of Cincinnati); Inez 
Beverly Prosser, Non-academic Development of Negro Children in Mixed and Segregated Schools 
(1933) (unpublishedEd.D. dissertation, University of Cincinnati); see also Allison Davis, Racial Status 
and Personality Development, 57 SCI. MONTHLY 354, 358-59 (1943) (suggesting that segregation 
benefits black children by "prevent[ing] sharp awareness of their subordinate status"). 
But in the postwar era, "[t]he social science literature that dealt with the black ego was markedly 
different" than before. "Scholars were now more than willing to advance the notion that African 
Americans suffered from self-hate, the most extreme identity problem, and to make it a central part of 
understanding the behavior of African Americans." P. 82. 
39. P. 123. 
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psychological harm to black children, Clark did eventually conclude from 
his famous doll studies that children in segregated schools were in fact 
psychologically damaged in ways that inhibited their ability to learn.40 
Moreover, thirty-five leading social scientists signed a statement prepared 
by Clark that was appended to the plaintiffs' brief in Brown and that 
affirmed the psychological harm to black children caused by school 
segregation. 41 With the issue of school segregation at stake, liberal social 
scientists closed ranks to issue their condemnation. 
The Court embraced the psychological argument in Brown: "Whatever 
may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy 
v. Ferguson," the Court wrote, "modem authority" supported the view that 
school segregation "generates a feeling of inferiority as to [black 
children's] status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds 
in a way unlikely ever to be undone. "42 Thus, segregated schools could 
never be equal. 
In the wake of Brown, damage imagery became part of the rhetoric 
against segregation. For example, Ralph Bunche attacked school segre-
gation a few months after the Brown decision, arguing that the average 
black father "wants for his children the best education possible on the same 
basis as other American children and under conditions which will not scar 
them with the psychological wounds of inferiority through enforced 
segregation. "43 Similarly, Martin Luther King, in his famous letter from 
the Birmingham jail in 1963, opposed segregation by arguing that "any law 
that degrades human personality is unjust. All segregation statutes are 
unjust because segregation distorts the soul and damages the 
personality. "44 King's letter was designed in part to appeal to white 
40. Clark asked a number of black children to select the "nice" doll between a black and a white 
doll and concluded from their answers that black children in segregated schools suffered psychological 
harm that inhibited their ability to Jearn. These studies are described in KENNETH B. CLARK, 
PREJUDICE AND YOUR CHILD 17-24 (2d ed. 1963). To Scott, and other observers as well, Clark's 
"reasoning was tortured" and was influenced by his keen desire to strike a blow against segregation. 
P. 124. For critics of Clark's conclusions, see RALPH ROSS & ERNESf VAN DEN HAAG, THE FABRIC 
OF SOCIETY 165-66 (1957) ("Professor Clark tested sixteen children between the ages of six and nine 
in Clarendon County, South Carolina, and elsewhere about three hundred children. This number would 
be too small to test reaction to a new soap."); Edmond Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150, 
164-66 (1955) (questioning Clark's objectivity and testing methods); Ernest van den Haag, Social 
Science Testimony in the Desegregation Cases-A Reply to Professor Kenneth Clark, 6 VILL. L. REV. 
69, 69 (1960) ("Probably Professor Clark has done but negligible damage to the Negro cause and to 
the integrity of our judicial processes. But I remain disturbed about the disrepute his 'evidence' could 
not fail to bring to social science if it were taken seriously."). 
41. See pp. 129-30. 
42. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). 
43. P. 138 (quoting Ralph Bunche, The Fonvard March of Democracy, in THE CRY FOR FREEDOM 
160 (Frank W. Hale ed., 1969)). 
44. P. 138 (quoting MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., Letter from a Birmingham Jail, in WHY WE 
CAN'T WAIT 76, 82 (Mentor 1964) (1963)). 
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sensibilities about the injustice of racial oppression. Indeed, much of the 
rhetoric and action of the black freedom struggle of the early 1960s was 
designed to appeal to Northern white sympathies. 
According to Scott, in the wake of the enactment of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, "the American creed of 
equal opportunity and democracy was on the verge of realization. The 
main legal barriers preventing blacks from entering the mainstream of 
society no longer existed. "45 Yet despite this success, most civil rights 
activists did not believe that they had reached the end of reform. Instead, 
they shifted their attention toward improving the economic status of African 
Americans. "Operating on the premise that African Americans had a need 
for and a claim to special assistance, a race-conscious liberalism appeared 
that called for the state and business to take a race-based approach to black 
economic empowerment and social rehabilitation. "46 According to Scott, 
this "idea of race-conscious social policies exceeded anything envisioned 
in the American creed. "47 
Those who supported the new race-conscious liberalism put forth a 
case for black exceptionalism. "Invoking damage imagery and 
manipulating the therapeutic ethos, race-conscious liberals, taking their cue 
from black leaders, argued that blacks, unlike immigrants, were owed and 
in need of preferential, compensatory programs. "48 For example, 
Whitney Young of the National Urban League proposed a domestic 
Marshall Plan which called for $20 billion in government programs to deal 
with the legacy of generations of oppression of African Americans.49 
Kenneth Clark also called for compensatory programs for blacks, saying, 
"If we're going to correct this past damage, we are going to have to 
correct it by direct, effective action which takes into account the nature of 
the damage."50 
During the 1960s, one of the programs that would eventually capture 
both governmental and business support was the idea of the benign use of 
race in hiring decisions. One of the earliest endorsements of this type of 
affirmative action was President Lyndon Johnson's executive order 11,246, 
which required government contractors to make adequate use of minority 
workers. President Johnson justified affirmative action at his 1965 com-
mencement speech at Howard University by describing African Americans 
45. P. 139. 
46. P. 139. 
47. P. 139. 
48. P. 140. 
49. Seep. 148. 
50. P. 149 (quoting Interviews: What Negroes in the Nonh are Really After, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REP., June 10, 1963, at 37-40). 
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as burdened by "the scars of centuries" that inhibited their ability to 
compete.51 
D. The Radical Critique of Damage Imagery, 1965-1980 
During the late 1960s, radical social scientists sharply rejected damage 
imagery as a way of describing African Americans, instead promoting the 
image of the "resilient black psyche. "52 The intellectual impulses that 
drove this rejection of damage were rising racial pride and a rejection of 
assimilation as a social goal. To be sure, black nationalists had long used 
damage imagery in their appeals for support. As Malcolm X wrote in his 
autobiography: "You cannot find one black man ... who has not been 
personally damaged in some way by the devilish acts of the collective white 
man!"53 However, as Scott notes, radicals in the late 1960s adopted 
Malcolm X's macho style, but rejected his use of damage imagery. 
The Black Power generation was "well aware of the meaning of 
damage imagery in the political culture. The conservative co-optation of 
damage imagery to explain the [Watts] riotO was well known to 
radicals. "54 Aware of the political uses of social science imagery, radical 
social scientists moved away from pathology and towards a reinterpretation 
of black psychology that celebrated the strength .and resiliency of black 
people and culture. They argued "that blacks were seen as pathological 
primarily because they deviated from white norms, which were used as the 
universal standard of health. "55 
The radical rejection of damage imagery also involved labeling as 
racist anyone who used such imagery. Finding no meaningful distinction 
between damage imagery and innate inferiority, "the radicals placed a 
moral stigma on damage imagery and those who produced it. ;'56 As a 
result, many liberals abandoned damage imagery or at least deemphasized 
it. Others continued to speak of damage, but, to insulate themselves from 
charges of racism, made clear that the cause of damage was "the social 
51. Lyndon B. Johnson, CommencementAddress at Howard University: "To Fulfill These Rights" 
(June 4, 1965), in 2 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED ~ATES: LYNDON B. 
JOHNSON 1965, at 635, 636 (1966). 
52. P. 162. 
53. P. 165 (quoting MALCOLM X, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X 269 (1965) (emphasis 
in original)). 
54. P. 170 (footnote omitted). According to Scott, 
The Watts riot transformed the political equation and placed conservatives in control of 
damage imagery. In the public discussion after Watts, the image of the black family as 
the source of psychological and social pathology loomed large. The social problems 
associated with the black family became the basis for the conservatives' riot theory. 
P. 156. 
55. P. 179. 
56. P. 177. 
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system" or other factors external to the black community. For example, 
the Kerner Commission report on civil disorders emphasized the role of 
white racism in the urban riots of the 1960s.57 But although the radicals 
minimized the use of damage imagery for a few years, they could not stop 
its use. 
E. Contemporary Use of Damage Imagery 
Despite the radical rejection of damage imagery, the depiction of black 
people as uniquely damaged by their group experience has continued. 
Since the late 1970s, the ever-worsening conditions for many urban 
blacks-high crime rates, drug use, poor educational outcomes-has led to 
a resurgence of the use of damage imagery. In light of these conditions, 
many liberals, silenced during the late 1960s and 1970s by the radical 
critique, have rediscovered damage imagery. As Scott notes, "the 
worsening social conditions and the concomitant rise in violent crimes in 
the black community have caused left-of-center experts to slowly but surely 
reconsider and abandon the moratorium on damage imagery. "58 
Moreover, for many left-of-center experts, the "rediscovery of pathology 
represents an attempt at social realism rather than an appeal directed at 
gainiiig white sympathy. "59 Once again, liberal social scientists and pol-
icymakers are using the language of damage to support new racial 
policies. 60 
At the same time, conservative experts and policymakers have increas-
ingly blamed the pathology of black families and culture for the social 
problems of African Americans, although extending the blame in recent 
years to Great Society programs that have created black dependency.61 
57. Seep. 182. 
58. P. 193. 
59. P. 196. As sociologist Orlando Patterson commented in 1993, given the social crisis in the 
black community, "it is perhaps overdefensive and counterproductive to emphasize the 'resilience' and 
'strength' of the black family .... " P. 197 (quoting Orlando Patterson, Black/ash: The Crisis of 
Gender Relations Among African Americans, 3 TRANsmoN (n.s.) 15 (1993)). In a similar vein, 
Afrocentric experts, recognizing self-image problems among black males, have proposed all-black, all-
male schools to serve the needs of black youth. See Joshua E. Kimerling, Black Male Academies: Re-
Examining the Strategy of Integration, 42 BUFF. L. REV. 829, 833-34 (1994) (discussing the trend 
toward the increased use of all-black, all-male public educational academies). In arguing for the 
establishment of these schools, however, they have avoided appeals for white sympathy. 
60. For example, in 1996, philosopher Richard Rorty called for liberals to develop a means of 
conveying the suffering endured by victims of discrimination to the self-interested middle class. See 
Richard Rorty, What's Wrong with 'Rights', HARPER'S, June 1996, at 15, 15-18 (arguing that a rights-
based political discourse fails to assist the empowerment of traditionally disadvantaged groups). In 
1991, Representative John Conyers of Michigan introduced legislation that called for a commission to 
"examine the institution of slavery, subsequent de jure and de facto racial and economic discrimination 
against African Americans, and the impact of these forces on living African Americans." P. 190 
(quoting H.R. 1684, 102d Cong. (1991)). 
61. Justice Clarence Thomas nnrcnPtl th;. thPmP nf tlPnPn..!Pn,.u ;n Adnrmzd, commenting that 
preferential programS SUCh aS affiffili1UV" i11,;UUIIIIUL UIU.)' ~Li1U1p IIIIIIUIIU"~ Willi i1 ° 
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Scott argues that damage imagery has assumed "an important part of the 
foundation of conservative reform. Republicans have successfully 
promoted the image of an underclass as a pathological creation of the 
liberal state, and damage imagery now underwrites the dismantlement of 
social welfare policy and the expansion of the federal criminal justice 
system .... "62 For Scott, the conservative use of damage imagery bears 
the potential for greater harm: 
As America moves further to the Right, the experts' emerging · 
consensus on black people as damaged becomes more perilous. In 
social policy making, damage imagery has ever served the cause of 
the hegemonic political ideology. . . . With vast segments of the 
white middle class experiencing downward mobility, they see 
themselves as the true victims and reserve their pity for personal use. 
Joining ranks with the less fortunate whites, they increasingly harbor 
contempt for blacks. 63 
Certainly, the embrace of damage imagery as a significant method of char-
acterizing African Americans shows no signs of abating. 
II. The Wisdom of Using Damage Imagery to Justify Remedial Policies 
What can we say about the efficacy of using damage imagery to win 
support for racial reform policies? Scott argues that though the use of 
damage imagery to attract white support for antidiscrimination measures 
may have contributed to certain victories such as the Supreme Court's 
Brown decision, it has ultimately harmed the black community. According 
to Scott, appealing to white sympathy to win support for racial fairness has 
had the effect of maintaining "a paternalistic relationship between whites 
and blacks" and making "black rights contingent upon white sympathy and 
superiority rather than black equality and citizenship. "64 Moreover, when 
justice claims are grounded in notions of damage, the emphasis can quickly 
shift from the injustice of past discrimination to the claim that black people 
are inherently pathological. For example, focusing on black pathology can 
"justify neglect and draconian policies, "65 such as increased incarceration 
of African Americans and the jettisoning of economic assistance programs. 
In addition, damage imagery "has made the black community wary of self-
but they also "may cause them to develop dependencies or to adopt an attitude that they are 'entitled' 
to preferences." Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 241 (1995) (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
62. P. 199. 
63. P. 202 (footnote omitted). 
64. P. 184. 
65. P. xviii. 
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examination and self-criticism ... , [a] most unfortunate development for 
a people in need of self-knowledge. "66 
Scott argues that civil rights activists during the 1950s and 1960s 
should have grounded their racial justice claims not on appeals to white 
sympathy, but on the notion that segregation and discrimination are incon-
sistent with the American creed and with our fundamental notions of 
equality. For example, Scott criticizes the Brown decision in part because 
the Court "suggested oppression had to cease not because blacks were 
equal citizens who deserved justice but because they were humans and 
segregation was inhumane. "67 Similarly, the use of damage imagery to 
invoke support for affirmative action "played on white paternalism rather 
than the need to make amends for social injustices. "68 
Yet Scott's critique of the liberal use of damage imagery raises two 
issues. First, could racial reformers during the civil rights era have 
captured political and cultural support for desegregation without using 
arguments grounded in notions of harm or damage? Second, how should 
racial reformers justify their policy initiatives today? 
A. The Politics of Racial Reform 
Scott criticizes the racial reform efforts of the civil rights era, arguing 
that "[r]ather than standing on the ideals of the American creed and making 
reparations for the nation's failure to live up to the separate-but-equal 
doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson, liberals capitulated to the historic tendency 
of posing blacks as objects of pity. "69 But Scott's critique of racial lib-
erals during the 1950s and 1960s betrays a misunderstanding of the politics 
of racial reform in this country. 
Racial reform in this country has typically required an appeal to white 
interest. Derrick Bell, who makes the point most starkly, has argued that 
white elites will recognize the rights of Mrican Americans and other per-
sons of color "only when such recognition serves some economic or 
political interests of greater importance to whites. "70 Indeed, during the 
civil rights era, desegregation initiatives frequently served white political 
and economic interests, creating what Bell labels an "interest 
convergence"71 that made racial reform possible. 
66. P. xviii. 
67. P. 184. 
68. P. 184. 
69. P. xiii. 
70. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., California's Proposition 209: A Temporary Diversion on the Road to 
Racial Disaster, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1447, 1452 (1997). 
71. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 
93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980). 
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For example, during the late 1940s, a number of Northern states and 
cities enacted legislation and ordinances barring racial discrimination in 
public accommodations, employment, education, and housing. These mea-
sures were motivated in part by the desire of white elites to capture 
political support from the growing number of black voters and to stem bur-
geoning racial tensions and fears triggered by wartime urban riots.72 
Similarly, the support of the United States government for desegregation 
in the Brown case, as evidenced by the Solicitor General's brief, was 
grounded in part in the belief that desegregation served important foreign 
policy interests as America engaged in a Cold War struggle to win support 
from nonwhite peoples in Third World nations.73 During the early 1960s, 
some Southern cities enacted antidiscrimination ordinances to defuse eco-
nomically embarrassing demonstrations and to avoid experiencing economic 
losses from racial unrest such as those suffered in Little Rock and 
Birmingham. 74 As one Southern mayor explained his city's decision to 
end public accommodations discrimination: "[As a result of 
demonstrations,] the community's pocketbook is placed in jeopardy, as 
Birmingham and other cities have learned from experience. Whether we 
like it or not, we are pressed by circumstances . . . to break with long 
accepted social and economic patterns. "75 Similarly, Lyndon Johnson's 
affirmative action policies enjoyed significant support from white business 
elites who understood that these policies could prove useful in stemming 
unwanted urban unrest. 76 "If they're working, they won't be throwing 
bombs in your homes and plants," Lyndon Johnson told business 
leaders. 77 "Keep them busy and they won't have time to burn your 
cars. "78 
Although Bell argues that white elites will not support racial reform 
absent political or economic advantage, white interests in racial reform are 
72. See Davison M. Douglas, The Limits of Law in Accomplishing Racial Change: School 
Segregation in the Pre-BrownNonh, 44 UCLA L. REv. 677, 719-20 (1997) (discussing how northern 
whites began supponing civil rights initiatives because of the black population shift to the north, the 
resulting enhanced black political power, and fears of black radicalism). 
73. See Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61, 80-93 
(1988) (arguing that international attention given to racial segregation was troublesome and 
embarrassing enough to cause the U.S. government to panicipate in the desegregation cases). 
74. See DAVISON M. DOUGLAS, READING, WRmNG, & RACE: THE DESEGREGATION OF THE 
CHARLOITE SCHOOLS 96-103 (1995) (describing the decision to pass an antidiscrimination ordinance 
in Charlotte, North Carolina); SOUTHERN BUSINESSMEN AND DESEGREGATION (Elizabeth Jacoway & 
David Coburn eds., 1982) (describing business supponfor desegregation initiatives in various Southern 
cities during the early 1960s). 
75. DOUGLAS, supra note 74, at 102. 
76. See SKRENTNY, supra note 11, at 89-91. 
77. /d. at 91 (quoting JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR., THE TRIUMPH & TRAGEDY OF LYNDON 
JOHNSON: THE WHITE HOUSE YEARS 226 (1991)). 
78. /d. 
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probably broader than raw political or economic gain. Indeed, as Scott 
argues, appeals to white moral sensibilities did play a role in the success 
of desegregation initiatives during the civil rights era. Both the litigants in 
Brown and the racial demonstrators in the early 1960s understood the 
power of appeal to white sympathies. Even though the Supreme Court 
could have declared school segregation unconstitutional without evidence 
of harm, the evidence of educational harm from segregation made it easier 
for the Court to deal with its earlier precedents.79 Similarly, Martin 
Luther King and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference understood 
that violent repression by Southern law enforcement officers of nonviolent 
protesters would win support of middle class Northern whites for civil 
rights initiatives. Indeed, the selection of Birmingham, home to notori-
ously repressive law enforcement, to launch a major civil rights protest in 
1963 was deliberate. These strategies succeeded. White support for the 
major civil rights legislation of the mid-1960s was greatly enhanced by 
white indignation at the violent response to black protesters in cities such 
as Birmingham and Selma. 80 
In his interpretation of the black freedom struggle of the early 1960s, 
Scott celebrates the "bottom-up" quality of the mass movement: 
The 1960s witnessed and was transformed by the activism of 
southern blacks. Beginning with the sit-ins of college students in 
1960, blacks wrested control over the direction of racial liberalism 
from experts and national politicians, who preferred to direct change 
from the top down. Picking up support from liberal white students 
and elites who controlled vital institutions-the unions, the churches, 
the synagogues-black leaders were able to organize massive support 
for the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting 
Rights Act. In the end, . . . [i]t was the social activism of those said 
79. Moreover, arguments grounded in the harm of segregation were effectively used by other civil 
rights litigators during the 1950s and 1960s to justify desegregation positions. For example, African-
American parents challenging school segregation in Charlotte that resulted in the Supreme Court's 
decision in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971), used evidence 
to show that segregated black children had poorer educational outcomes than did white children, even 
though, in the wake of Brown, it was unnecessary to prove that segregation actually harmed black 
students. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 306 F. Supp. 1291, 1296-97 tbl. 
(W.D.N.C. 1969), vacated, 431 F.2d 138 (4th Cir. 1970), aff'd in part, 402 U.S. 1 (1971). But "[a]s 
the plaintiffs' counsel Adam Stein later explained: 'We had had enough experience trying discrimination 
cases to know that many district judges were going to do less than the law required unless they could 
be persuaded that there was something particularly bad going on that needed to be corrected.'" 
DOUGLAS, supra note 74, at 159-60. The strategy worked. The district court judge, in justifying a 
sweeping desegregation order, commented: "This alarming contrast in performance ... was not fully 
known to the court before he studied the evidence in the case. It can not be explained solely in terms 
of cultural, racial or family background without honestly facing the impact of segregation .... 
Segregation produces inferior education .... " Swann, 306 F. Supp. at 1297. 
80. See DAVID J. GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE 
SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE 227-30 (1986). 
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to be too affiicted to stand up for their own rights that brought an 
end to social exclusion. 81 
To be sure, the success of the black freedom struggle of the 1960s is an 
enduring tribute to bottom-up activism and the courage of countless 
individuals. But to some extent, this success was a function of the 
protesters' ability to appeal to white sensibilities, or in the words of Bell, 
to create a convergence of interests between blacks and whites.82 
Speaking in terms of the "damage" or "harm" caused by segregation 
became an important means of appealing to white interests. 
As Scott argues, racial liberals may have unwittingly stigmatized 
African Americans by using damage imagery to appeal to white 
sensibilities, but Scott underestimates the political necessity of appealing in 
some way to white interests to justify racial reform. If one accepts the 
view of Bell concerning the profound resistance of white America to racial 
reform, 83 then appeals to white interests were probably necessary during 
the civil rights era and may still be necessary, just as Bell's interest 
convergence theory is likely applicable today. Theories of damage or harm 
are not the only ways of making such appeals. But if remedial justifi-
cations grounded in harm are rejected, then alternative methods of securing 
white support for racial reform will have to be found. 
B. Justifying Racial Reform 
Scott's book is primarily concerned with the ways in which prior 
generations have constructed African Americans as damaged. Yet Scott's 
critique of damage imagery invites the question of how contemporary poli-
cymakers should address issues of race in this country. Although critical 
of much current integrationist sentiment,84 Scott at least impliedly 
81. Pp. 138-39. 
82. Scott recognizes that those radicals who rejected damage imagecy in the late 1960s and early 
1970s ignored the importance of the legitimization of reform: 
Committed to a social theocy that viewed social change as taking place from the bottom 
up, the radical critics of damage imagecy never addressed the need of policymakers to find 
a top-down justification for making political and economic changes. Those who exercise 
power generally recognize the need for legitimating ideas. In ways that their radical 
critics failed to appreciate, postwar liberals who manipulated damage imagecy were 
sophisticated experts and politicians who understood how to make public policy from the 
top down. 
Pp. 183-84. Scott notes, for example, that race-conscious programs such as affirmative action 
"exceeded the normal bounds of the American creed," and that therefore proponents of such programs 
needed to manipulate damage imagecy to win support. P. 184. 
83. See DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 60-63 (3d ed. 1992); Derrick Bell, 
Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REv. 363 passim (1992). 
84. "[M]y disagreement with certain integrationist assumptions looms large in my analysis. Like 
many other blacks who believe in pluralism, I take issue with the integrationist belief that black 
institutions are inherently inferior." P. xviii. 
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endorses the notion of compensatory reparations for African Americans, 
criticizing, for example, recent congressional initiatives for failing to seek 
such reparations. 85 
Implicit in Scott's endorsement of reparations is the notion that 
African Americans have been harmed by the legacy of segregation and dis-
crimination and should be compensated in some way for that harm. 
Indeed, other claims for reparations, such as for Japanese Americans86 or 
Native Americans, P>1 have been justified as redressing harm suffered as a 
result of egregious governmental conduct. 88 Yet, while Scott appears to 
endorse "preferential programs" of a nonspecific nature grounded in the 
"obligation of the nation to pay reparations for violating black rights, "89 
he vehemently argues against the proposition of using harm to justify pro-
black social policies. 90 Scott does not explain the apparent contradiction 
between his support for reparations and his opposition to using notions of 
harm to support remedial policies. 
The current debate over affirmative action, the most controversial of 
race-conscious preference programs (and about which Scott unfortunately 
85. P. 184. Following congressional legislation in 1988 approving reparations for Japanese 
Americans, many African Americans called for similar programs for African Americans. See BELL, 
supra note 83, at 51-55. 
86. Congress enacted the Civil Liberties Act of 1988 to compensate Japanese Americans forced 
to leave their homes and relocate in concentration camps in the western United States during World 
War II. The legislation provided $20,000 and an apology to those persons of Japanese ancestry who 
were interned at that time. See Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903 
(1988). 
87. In 1946, for example, Congress established an Indian Claims Commission to adjudicate claims 
by Indian tribes not merely for treaty violations, but also on the ground that some treaties between the 
United States and Indian tribes were negotiated on the basis of fraud, duress, unconscionable 
consideration, and the absence of fair and honorable dealings. See BORIS I. BITIKER, THE CASE FOR 
BLACK REPARATIONS 22 (1973); H.D. ROSENTHAL, THEIR DAY IN COURT: A HISTORY OF THE INDIAN 
CLAIMS COMMISSION (1990); see also Howard Schneider, Canada Apologizes for Abusing Native 
Peoples, WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 1998, at AI (announcing the establishment of a "healing fund" to 
compensate those native Canadian children "who suffered physical and mental abuse at the government-
run schools"). 
88. Over the years, various demands have been made for the payment of reparations to African 
Americans. One such demand, in 1969, called for monetary reparations "due us as people who have 
been exploited and degraded, brutalized, killed, and persecuted." BmKER, supra note 87, at 4. 
89. P. 184. 
90. Scott apparently objects to reliance on any notion of harm to justify racial reform, as when 
he writes: 
In 1991, rather than proposing reparations for the violations of black rights, 
Representative John Conyers of Michigan introduced a bill before Congress that called for 
a commission to "examine the institutions of slavery, subsequent de jure and de facto 
racial and economic discrimination against African Americans, and the impact of these 
forces on Jiving African Americans." 
P. 190 (quoting H.R. 1684, 102d Cong. (1991)). Scott's objection to Conyers's proposed legislation 
is curious given that it was designed to Jay the groundwork for the type of reparations program that 
Scott appears to favor. See BELL, supra note 83, at 51 (describing Conyers's 1991 bill as "reparations 
legislation"). 
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says little), illustrates the possibility of justifying preferential programs 
without reference to theories of harm. Although one traditional justi-
fication for affirmative action has been the idea that it redresses the effects 
of past discrimination,91 at least two other justifications quite apart from 
damage theory have assumed importance in the debate over affirmative 
action. One justification, which dates back to early discussions of 
affirmative action, is the notion that benign considerations of race are 
needed to overcome ongoing discrimination against persons of color. Even 
though antidiscrimination laws are now in place that govern the workplace 
and the university, affirmative action may be needed to address subtle 
forms of discrimination that the legal system has not corralled. This jus-
tification is not remedial in nature but is rather prophylactic and does not 
depend on showings of past harm for its legitimacy. 92 A second justifica-
tion is that affirmative action promotes a more racially and ethnically 
diverse workplace or classroom. 93 
But a full rejection of remedial justifications for racial policies may 
bring unintended consequences. The contemporary debate over urban 
school desegregation is instructive. During the past decade, support for an 
end to busing in urban school districts has increased among both whites 
and blacks.94 Yet some fear that the end of school busing will inevitably 
harm black children. Gary Orfield and Susan Eaton of the Harvard Project 
on School Desegregation explain: 
When discrimination is officially declared to have fully been rectified 
and the policies for resegregation are accepted by courts and 
community leaders as educationally sound, the blame for the 
pervasive inequalities that remain tends to be shifted to minority 
families and communities, the teachers, and the educational leaders. 
When discrimination is declared cured, the system can no longer be 
blamed. 
91. See CHRISTOPHER EDLEY, JR., NOT ALL BLACK AND WHITE: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, RACE, 
AND AMERICAN VALUES 78 (1996); John E. Morrison, Colorblindness, Individuality, and Merit: An 
Analysis of the Rhetoric Against Affirmative Action, 79 IOWA L. REv. 313, 320-21 (1994) ("America's 
history makes color-consciousness inevitable ••. until society obliterates all traces of past injustices. 
This rhetoric often demands reparations for past injustices suffered by African-Americans during the 
periods of slavery and segregation."); Richard Delgado, Why Universities Are Morally Obligated to 
Strive for Diversity: Restoring the Remedial Rationale for Affirmative Action, 68 U. COLO. L. REv. 
1165, 1166 (1997) (justifying affirmative action as "redress for past discrimination"). 
92. See EDLEY, supra note 91, at 78-79. 
93. ee id. at 79. One critique of diversity rationales is the view that they stereotype minorities as 
possessing a shared outlook, a criticism with which Scott is likely sympathetic. See, e.g., Paul Butler, 
Affirmative Action and Criminal Law, 68 U. COLO. L. REv. 841, 852-53 (1997). 
94. For example, black mayors in several major cities, including Cleveland, Denver, and 
Minneapolis, have supported the termination of mandatory desegregation plans, despite the 
resegregative effects of those decisions. See Davison M. Douglas, The End of Busing?, 95 MICH. L. 
REv. 1715, 1731 & n.67 (1997) (book review). 
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. . . The predictable failure of inner-city segregated schools then 
feeds cynicism and generates attacks on the entire system of public 
education. The failure often reinforces white stereotypes about what 
critics describe as the inferior culture of minority families, 
reinforcing growing suburban resistance to providing state resources 
to heavily minority urban school systems.95 
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One may disagree with Orfield and Eaton's conclusions about the value of 
school integration, but their comments are a reminder that if notions of 
harm from the legacy of discrimination are jettisoned, African Americans 
are increasingly vulnerable to claims that poor social, educational, and eco-
nomic outcomes are a function of their own moral failure and pathology. 
If we abandon the notion that African Americans have been harmed by 
decades of discrimination and segregation, then "blaming the victim" 
becomes a much simpler task. 
Resolution of the issue of whether to use harm-based remedial justifi-
cations may lie in a closer analysis of the type of harm, or damage, to 
which Scott objects. Scott's objections are largely directed at descriptions 
of African Americans as psychologically and culturally damaged. 
Discussion of the pathology of the black family or black males suggests the 
basic inferiority of black culture. Discussion of nonpsychological damage, 
such as poor education or lack of necessary job skills, to support remedial 
claims is somewhat removed from notions of inherent inferiority and closer 
to a more value-neutral notion of harm. For example, would Scott object 
to remedial programs justified on the grounds that African Americans have 
been denied equal educational opportunities and hence possess fewer job 
skills? 
Scott wants racial liberals to stop using damage imagery and notions 
of harm, but those intent on finding black culture inferior will hardly cease 
their efforts to examine and analyze the reasons for poor social outcomes 
in the black community. For over a century, the image of the African 
American has been the subject of debate among social scientists, pundits, 
and policymakers-both conservative and liberal-and this debate will 
undoubtedly continue. If racial liberals refrain from probing notions of 
harm and damage, as Scott urges, the conversation will nevertheless 
continue, only to be dominated by those who have considerably more "fear 
and contempt" for African Americans than sympathy.96 
95. GARY ORAELD ET AL., DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN 
V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 332-33 (1996). 
96. P. 202. 
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III. Conclusion 
Scott has written a fascinating book about the ways in which 
intellectuals and policymakers during this century have depicted the 
African-American personality and used notions of damage to justify racial 
reform. Though this use of damage imagery reflected humanitarian 
impulses, it did arguably have the effect of making "black rights contingent 
upon white sympathy and superiority rather than black equality and 
citizenship. "97 By the same token, exploiting notions of harm was proba-
bly necessary to achieve the desegregation and antidiscrimination goals of 
the civil rights era. 
Scott's book leaves us with the question of how best to justify racial 
reform. Should notions of damage and harm be entirely abandoned? 
Scott's call for social scientists and policymakers "to place the inner lives 
of people off limits"98 is understandable, but to the extent that it curbs 
ongoing exploration of the reasons for poor outcomes in certain social 
groups, it is misguided. The answer may lie in finding new ways of 
speaking about the harms of past discrimination that avoid reaffirming tor-
tured notions of black inferiority. 
97. P. 184. 
98. P. xix. 
